Pandemic-era financial instability required central banks around the world to expand their roles as lenders of last resort and, in some cases, become market makers of last resort. These extraordinary interventions stabilized financial markets by restoring funding and market liquidity, while at the same time greatly expanding central bank balance sheets and increasing central bank risk exposure. This paper examines the implications of pandemice-era last-resort policy interventions on central bank balance sheets, providing a comparative analysis of expanded asset holdings, subsequent balance sheet reductions as part of quantitative tightening, and announcements of losses. The evidence suggests that markets have had a benign view of central bank losses due to the measures taken in extraordinary circumstances. The impacts of last-resort policies during the pandemic do not seem to have diminished central banks’ ability to achieve monetary policy and financial stability objectives.

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Consequences of Last-Resort Policy for Central Bank Balance Sheets

  • Kathryn M. E. Dominguez

摘要

Pandemic-era financial instability required central banks around the world to expand their roles as lenders of last resort and, in some cases, become market makers of last resort. These extraordinary interventions stabilized financial markets by restoring funding and market liquidity, while at the same time greatly expanding central bank balance sheets and increasing central bank risk exposure. This paper examines the implications of pandemice-era last-resort policy interventions on central bank balance sheets, providing a comparative analysis of expanded asset holdings, subsequent balance sheet reductions as part of quantitative tightening, and announcements of losses. The evidence suggests that markets have had a benign view of central bank losses due to the measures taken in extraordinary circumstances. The impacts of last-resort policies during the pandemic do not seem to have diminished central banks’ ability to achieve monetary policy and financial stability objectives.