In Defense of Human Rights: Searching for a Viable Kind of Objectivity

This chapter argues that the defense of human rights would be impossible if the notion of objectivity were meaningless. Assuming that our behavior is successful when guided by objectively correct beliefs, any attempt to acquire or defend human rights can only be effective if the beliefs prompting action are not just subjectively correct but also supported by objectively valid reasons. There are many conceptions of objectivity, ranging from absolutist views to those that deny the concept’s coherence. Not all these conceptions are useful. This chapter aims to outline a ‘workable’ conception of objectivity—one that considers our actual practices of acquiring and controlling knowledge. Since conceptions of objectivity are closely linked to metaphysical conceptions, the criticism of some conceptions of objectivity will be guided by the criticism of their underlying metaphysical conceptions. The proposal made in the last section of this chapter is called a human conception precisely because it is related to our concrete practice, much more so than rival conceptions.