Addiction as a Rigid Disposition Towards Akratic Actions

Classical theories of substance addiction stress that the addicted person cannot control their behavior concerning drug consumption. However, recent accounts contend that their behavior is intentional, deliberate, and free. Among these new models, the interpretation of substance addiction as akratic behavior is a fascinating interdisciplinary effort to understand the phenomenology of this disorder. An akratic behavior occurs when the subject knows the best course of action according to reason but deliberately acts against it. Then, is addiction an automatic or a deliberate behavior? In this chapter, we explain that addiction may be understood as a rigid habit that tends toward akratic actions. First, we outline the main theories of substance addiction, explaining in depth Heather’s interpretation of addiction as akrasia. Second, a comprehensive account of the Platonic and Aristotelian notions of akrasia is presented, highlighting the interpretations of Amelie Rorty and Alfred Mele. Third, since addiction and akrasia may be understood as habits, we explain our view on the Aristotelian notion of habit and the main criterion to distinguish good (i.e., flexible) and bad (i.e., rigid) habits: cognitive enrichment. Finally, since addiction is acquired through cognitively impoverished actions, we argue that addiction is a bad habit that disposes the agent towards akratic actions. Therefore, even though some deliberative ability is preserved, the rigid and automatic nature of addiction comes into conflict with an entirely intentional behavior. In conclusion, the relationship between addiction and akrasia is clarified through the revised Aristotelian notion of habit.