The New Challenges for Sino–EU Relations

In a recent historical context, the Sino–EU relationship is initially seen as a “strategic partnership” from which both markets’ businesses have benefited greatly. But due to all kinds of geopolitical disputes, their relations have gradually changed into a ‘systemic rivalry’ which can differ hugely per EU member state. With the rise of China and other emerging market countries in the 1990s, the share of China’s GDP in global GDP has grown significantly, while the share of the US’s and EU’s GDP has become relatively smaller. The post-war rules-based US-led world order of multilateralism based on globalization and liberalization of goods, services, and factors of production has significantly stimulated trade and investment opportunities from which initially the US in particular, but later also the EU and China, were able to fully benefit. Although China has been participating in Western multilateral international institutions, such as the WTO, for a number of decades, it has recently become increasingly evident that their interpretation of multilateralism is based more on bilateral agreements rather than universally binding rules. With the advent of a more authoritative and assertive state-led, China-oriented regional governance system under Xi Jinping, a much more powerful China is increasingly rejecting the principles of the multilateral unipolar world order in favour of a less emphatic multipolar world order on democratic norms and values. Particularly because of China’s partnership with Russia and other recent geopolitical disputes with the West, it has become increasingly difficult for the EU to maintain an equidistant and bridging role between democratic Washington and autocratic Beijing. The response to the changed mutual relations with China as a partner, competitor, or systemic rival is the new EU ‘de-risking’ strategy introduced since 2023 and the interconnected EU Economic Security Strategy. The key to this agenda is the diversification of strategic key supply chains, both to increase resilience and to hinder enemy countries’ access to sensitive technology such as advanced semiconductors.