Experimental Skepticism and the Question of Values in Nietzsche’s Thought

In recent years, the question of Nietzsche’s position on skepticism has taken on new vigor. On the one hand, although it cannot be easily ascertained what sources of ancient skepticism he was familiar with, Nietzsche’s point of view is closer to the Pyrrhonian version, at least in the sense that it is more an attitude, virtue, or method than a logical or epistemological position. However, Nietzsche in fact deals directly with the versions of skepticism that, in his opinion, are contemporary and mainly in line with the discussion of Kantianism; although there are some notable exceptions, for example, among modern philosophers, he reads Montaigne. On the other hand, his own epistemological theses, mainly those that propose the paradox of truth as error, prompt us to consider whether he falls into relativism, negative dogmatism, or simply a dead end. For any scholar of Nietzsche’s philosophy, in addition to the difficulty of establishing what skepticism actually is, there is an additional one: the wide range of Nietzsche’s questions and positions. His skepticism may well be both a praxis used to undermine dogmatic positions and an instrument used to reveal paradoxes.