\(\textsf{LR}\) - \(\textsf{OT}\) : Leakage-Resilient Oblivious Transfer

Oblivious Transfer ( \(\textsf{OT}\) ) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, becoming a crucial component of a practical secure protocol. \(\textsf{OT}\) is typically implemented in software, and one way to accelerate its running time is by using hardware implementations. However, such implementations are vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCAs). On the other hand, protecting interactive protocols against SCA is highly challenging because of their longer secrets (which include inputs and randomness), more complicated design, and running multiple instances. Consequently, there are no truly practical leakage-resistant \(\textsf{OT}\) protocols yet. In this paper, we introduce two tailored indistinguishability-based security definitions for leakage-resilient \(\textsf{OT}\) , focusing on protecting the sender’s state. Second, we propose a practical semi-honest secure \(\textsf{OT}\) protocol that achieves these security levels while minimizing the assumptions on the protocol’s building blocks and the use of a secret state. Finally, we extend our protocol to support sequential composition and explore efficiency-security tradeoffs.