Vitalism and Mind

As discussed in Chap. 2 , Driesch (1908a, b) posited that an individual was governed by his/her own entelechy, for which he prepared the more specified term “psychoid”. Drawing on his Kantian philosophy of nature, Driesch (1908b) argued that the existence of the psychoid was well-supported by empirical evidence, and he declared that “our ‘psychoid’…is an agent or factor of nature, looked upon as part of Givenness” (p. 116). Driesch was well aware that both concepts—the entelechy and the psychoid—had their roots extending back to Aristotle. Now, this chapter explores the historical relationship between vitalism and mind, tracing developments from Aristotle to the present. It first introduces the Aristotelian framework prevalent during antiquity and the Middle Ages, and then discusses significant shifts in early modern natural philosophy. This chapter further examines the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, comparing vitalistic explanations in modern biology with analogous concepts in the social sciences that employed mental theories and concepts. Additionally, since Driesch refuted Hegel’s philosophy of the super mind (a term adapted in part from Driesch) and argued that human history was merely the accumulation of “the individual history of the acting man” (p. 117), this chapter will also briefly discuss prominent post-Enlightenment philosophies of history that utilized or criticized concepts of “super-personal factor[s] of acting in history” (p. 117). This chapter concludes by introducing the concept of mental vitalism.