This entry introduces Jacques Derrida’s concept of deconstruction and explores its relevance for theoretical and philosophical psychology. Rather than a method for “taking things apart,” deconstruction is presented as a sustained philosophical practice that interrogates the conditions under which meaning, subjectivity, and experience become thinkable. Key Derridean concepts such as différance, trace, the supplement, the critique of the metaphysics of presence, and undecidability are outlined as ways of rethinking familiar psychological categories such as mind, self, development, and disorder. The entry then examines how deconstruction entered English-language psychology, particularly through critical and feminist work in the 1980s and 1990s, and critically assesses influential appropriations in which deconstruction became a general idiom of textual or institutional critique. It argues that such uses often neglected Derrida’s more radical reworking of subjectivity, language, and truth, and discusses debates around relativism, realism, and the “death of the subject.” Finally, the entry considers the possibilities opened by deconstruction for psychology, including more reflexive and ethically responsive forms of inquiry, and suggests points of contact with discursive psychology, conversation analysis, and emotionography, as empirical approaches that resonate with Derrida’s challenge to the metaphysics of an autonomous, transparent inner subject.