This article presents a philosophically grounded and psychologically relevant overview of Edith Stein’s (1891–1942) contributions to phenomenological psychology, with particular emphasis on her analysis of empathy and intersubjectivity. After situating Stein within the Göttingen Circle and tracing her intellectual development from early critiques of positivist psychology to her later engagement with Thomistic metaphysics, the entry focuses on her account of empathy as an intentional, nonprimordial act through which another’s experience is directly disclosed without loss of alterity. Stein’s careful distinctions between empathy, sympathy, emotional contagion, and inference clarify empathy’s foundational role in social cognition and ethical understanding. Her phenomenological method offers a rigorous alternative to reductive psychological models by grounding interpersonal knowledge in lived experience rather than speculative causal mechanisms. The article concludes by highlighting the continued relevance of Stein’s work for contemporary theoretical and philosophical psychology, particularly regarding questions of meaning, relationality, and the structure of subjectivity.