In the current epistemological discussion, not only are scientific models seen as helpful tools for elucidating facts or uncovering novel entities, rules, and theories, but they are also categorized under these various terms: abstract entities, idealizations, fictions, surrogates, credible worlds, missing systems, make-believe, parables, functional, epistemic actions, and revealing capacities. This entry addresses these issues, pointing out their shortcomings in terms of epistemology and drawing on recent findings in cognitive research. With the use of distributed cognition and abductive cognition, it seeks to present and revise fictionalism by redefining the concepts of abstractness and ideality of models. The idea of “epistemic warfare,” which emphasizes the significance of differentiating between epistemic (scientific models) and non-epistemic (fictions, falsehoods, propaganda) weapons, is also highlighted in the essay. This perspective sees scientific endeavor as a complex struggle for rational knowledge. In light of the previous basic notions, the entry will finally describe both the current and desirable roles of models in psychological research.