Differential Quality Game for Assessing the Financial Resources of Parties During an APT Attack

Based on the application of the differential quality game, a mathematical model is developed to estimate the costs of parties during targeted APT attacks. The model is a part of a comprehensive ensemble of models included in the intellectual system for making decisions on ensuring information security (IS) of the objects of information activity, which may face the threat of targeted APT attacks against them. The model is developed based on the differential quality game’s primary purpose. The model’s main objective is to search for optimal strategies of players willing to allocate a portion of their financial resources to counter cyberattacks and protect their information assets. Furthermore, the proposed solution facilitates the analytical search not only for the game’s value but also enables the defence side to determine the qualitative characteristics of achieving IS goals when using optimal strategies for allocating its financial resources. Computational experiments have been conducted, providing a clear visualization of the game’s results.