Vastness, Penumbrae, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi: A Response to Robert Tsaturyan

In Zhuangzi and Early Chinese Philosophy (2004), I present a multi-layered argument in favor of a new interpretation of the critique of shifei 是非 judgments in the Qi Wu Lun 齊物論 (hereafter, QWL) and of the significance of vastness da 大 in the Xiao Yao You 逍遙遊. Robert Tsaturyan is worried that with this interpretation, I am advocating creating penumbrae of concepts in which we are obliged to contradict ourselves; these contradictory penumbra then spread everywhere, and force us to make self-contradictory judgments regarding atrocities, such as genocide. On the contrary, I shall show that acknowledging vagueness and indeterminacy where they are real is in fact required if we are to treat borderline cases in ethically sensitive ways: if people, animals, or circumstances fall in the penumbral borderlands of our concepts, then we are obligated not to impose those concepts in a dichotomous way. Failing to recognize indeterminacy where it exists could result in some kind of harm or injustice towards the penumbral subject, or in a failure to act well or appropriately given the indeterminacy of the situation. I therefore show that an ethics of vagueness is in fact obligatory. Finally, I argue that any cultivation of vastness that transcends all ethical values cannot be presupposed to be benign.