The Concepts of Nature and the Universe in Markus Gabriel’s New Realism

This article gives an interpretation of the concepts of nature and the universe as used by Markus Gabriel in his new realist fields of sense ontology and epistemology. I argue that the ontological domain, the field of sense, of the universe is an epistemological fusion, not capable of providing the substantive philosophy of nature Gabriel needs for his philosophical endeavours, while the notion of nature is not developed fully in Gabriel’s published work yet. I give the outlines of an extended concept of nature which Gabriel only hints at. I go on to argue that any route Gabriel might want to take in elaborating his concept of nature involves taking a stance towards the natural sciences and their capabilities. I take Hasok Chang’s and Michela Massimi’s recent proposals for new versions of scientific realism and conclude that Gabriel should side with an optimism concerning the natural sciences’ ability to know about nature. I emphasise that much philosophical work remains to be done by Gabriel in order to develop a sophisticated notion of nature that meets his own demands and requirements.