Absolute Dialetheism

There are no consistent world views. ‘Absolute Dialetheism’ is the view that the world exists, but with the qualification that ‘the world exists,’ is a true contradiction. I briefly reconstruct Gabriel’s argument against the existence of the world, and I show how the question concerning the existence of the world can be motivated by situating it within problems that arise within Schelling’s philosophy. I begin by considering the ground of Gabriel’s relative concept of existence, as well as questions concerning the possibility of the world and the concept of truth that is operative in SFO. While Gabriel’s fields of sense ontology commits him to a form of relative dialetheism, his argument against the existence of the world precludes the possibility of accepting Absolute Dialetheism. I argue that successfully asserting the truth of the no world view depends upon accepting the truth of Absolute Dialetheism. I further explore two forms of Absolute Dialetheism: the conceptual and trans-conceptual varieties. Finally, by following a Hegelian line of reasoning, I develop an alternative concept of existence by exploring the self-predicative character of claims concerning Absolute existence.