Existentialism as Anti-rationalism

In Neo-Existentialism Markus Gabriel argues that much contemporary theorizing about the mind is incoherent because it overlooks one of the conditions of its own intelligibility, namely our reflexive understanding of ourselves as distinct from objects and (other) animals. He agrees with Kant and Hegel that the very idea of a naturalistic theory of ourselves as “minds” rests on a category mistake. I agree, but I reject the rationalism that Gabriel takes from the idealist tradition and enlists in support of his argument. I defend in its stead a more traditional form of existentialism according to which existence should be understood as fundamentally recalcitrant to reason. I conclude by observing that if idealism rests on the thesis that the words “thought” and “intelligibility” refer to nothing peculiar to human understanding, but just mean things being some way or other, then it is a mere terminological maneuver, not a philosophical innovation.