This chapter briefly introduces the humanistic theory of wellbeing (HTW), which suggests that a life is good to the extent that it allows us to perform our humanness well. More concretely, our humanness is well performed when three universal human needs are satisfied. They are the need for stability, the need for change, and the need to and for care. The term humanness is also embedded in a normative framework, referred to as basic humanistic values. The premise of the HTW is that all living organisms care about how they are faring in life. Many species also care about how others are faring. This fundamental ability to care originates in a valuation mechanism that constitutes the biological cornerstone of wellbeing. The valuation mechanism explains why and how humans evaluate their lives and the lives of those around them. Valuations operate in different forms; some are quick, automatized, and controlled by System 1 thinking. Others are reflective and controlled by System 2 thinking. The psychology of goodness and badness, including central concepts in positive psychology, is reviewed with regard to these valuation mechanisms. The normative study of values has traditionally been the business of philosophy, which often distinguishes between prudential goodness and moral goodness. Something is prudentially good if it is valuable for the person whose life it is, whereas something is morally good if respecting others is explicitly valued. The chapter asks whether this distinction is too rigid and based on a tradition that erroneously favors the rational and competitive rather than the relational and cooperative attributes of human nature. The HTW is a normative theory. With reference to feminist epistemologies, it argues that a value-based wellbeing theory can be justified by means of scientific reasoning. Basically, the argument draws on the insight that scientific hypotheses cannot be directly confirmed by empirical observations. It is not the relation between a fact and a hypothesis that determines whether the hypothesis is correct; it is background believes held about that relation. Just as epistemic values are scientifically grounded in a consensus about background assumptions, the HTW argues that a moral value also can be accepted as a scientific background assumption. Allowing for the use of normative statements, HTW equates wellbeing with a good life. Wellbeing can be further defined as to like one’s life for the right reasons. To like one’s life means that it feels good and is thought of as good by the person who lives it. The right reason part of the definition is the normative element. This implies that liking one’s life is not a justified indicator of wellbeing if it violates a few, universal, humanistic values. Three values are particularly important: respecting basic human rights, avoiding preventable harm, and accepting an ethics of care. Importantly, an activity need not be aimed at humanistic values to be good, but the activity must be consistent with them. A distinction is made between hedonic wellbeing (HWB) and eudaimonic wellbeing (EWB). HWB means to be well in the sense of spontaneously like one’s life and is associated with fulfilling the need for stability. One major indicator of HWB is harmony feelings such as pleasure, happiness, and tranquility; another is spontaneous life judgments such as life satisfaction and the presence of meaning in life. EWB means to be well in the sense of becoming a better human being and is associated with the need for change. A major indicator of EWB is opportunity feelings such as interest, engagement, immersion, and wonder; another is reflective judgments such as wisdom and morality. The concept of EWB further includes the notion of betterment orientations, having to do with a will to improve and perform salient life tasks with some perfection or elegance. Personal growth, searching for meaning in life, and a will to be a good human being are indicators of the betterment dimension. The need to and for care is feeding into both HWB and EWB.