Ductive Force and Ductive Power: For a Phenomenological Theory of Norms

In this chapter, I begin by presenting a phenomenological analysis of norms, supported, above all, by the analytical and conceptual tools of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, more precisely, his treatment of intentionality in the fifth investigation. I distinguish between act quality and the semantic content of norms. I name the former “ductive force,” and I locate the deontic operators—for instance, obligation, prohibition, and permission, among others—in the semantic content. On this basis, I criticize an ambiguous use of the term “duty” in the usual forms in which the normative phenomenon is analyzed, confusingly designating both a type of ductive force (the obligatory) and a particular deontic operator (the obligation). In the second half of the chapter, I move from the ductive power of norms to their basis in the social world, which I call “ductive power,” that is, the social power to establish a bond between individuals or groups. I distinguish mainly three non-overlapping axes of the social world, with respect to the type of normative binding among individuals. I designate them by the terms “sociabilitas,” “imperium,” and “oikeiosis.” In closing, I show how important institutions of the social world are based primarily, but not exclusively, on one of these types of normative binding.