Introduction

The complexity of our current philosophical landscape makes it difficult to imagine that any unifying thinker, movement, or philosophical work will emerge any time soon to unite the discipline, either in perspective or concern. Things have simply become too messy for any sort of well-ordered philosophical cosmos. Still, there are commonalities of interest that for the time being provide the discipline of philosophy with something like a manageable map. One such concentration is shared by philosophers who believe that philosophical reflection on topics ranging from mathematics, biology, ethics, and language is at its best when informed by considering these subjects as involving human, or at least creaturely, activities. While such a perspective does not require that one be a Wittgensteinian, there is little doubt that Wittgenstein’s work has provided a major impetus for this direction in contemporary philosophy. Few contemporary pragmatists, practice theorists, phenomenologists, or philosophical naturalists would be willing to reject this aspect of his thought, and many, without regarding themselves as out-and-out Wittgensteinians, are glad to draw inspiration from his work. This includes such thinkers as Robert Brandom, Toril Moi, John McDowell, Hew Price, Martha Nussbaum, Charles Taylor, and numerous others. As of yet, however, there is no existing volume of essays dedicated to the theme of Wittgenstein and practice. Next is a brief sketch of my own view on the meaning of practice in Wittgenstein’s later work. For simplicity’s sake, I focus here exclusively on the Philosophical Investigations (PI). This is followed by a precis of each of the chapters gathered here.