Dream Memories, Metacognition, and the Nature of Dream Experiences

One key feature of many philosophical accounts of dream experiences is the attempt to explain their nature by drawing analogies to other wakeful experiences, most notably perceptual and imaginative experiences. Because we do not have direct access to dream experiences themselves, reports produced on the basis of dream memories have become central for those attempts. The reliance on analogies to wakeful experiences and dream reports does, however, generate what I call the asymmetry problem. This is the problem according to which there is an asymmetry in the way that reports of wakeful experiences and reports of dream experiences are produced, which is potentially misleading when drawing parallels between those experiences. Against this backdrop, my goal in this chapter is twofold. First, I argue that the asymmetry problem can be overcome by investigating how metacognition allows us to distinguish between memories of wakeful experiences and memories of dream experiences. Second, I build on this discussion to tentatively suggest a view of the nature of dream experiences according to which they are neither perceptual experiences nor imaginative experiences, but rather intensified forms of mind-wandering. The focus on metacognition and dream memories thus points to novel and interesting ways in which we can move forward central discussions in the philosophy of dreams.