Conclusion

In this book, I have argued that Martin Heidegger’s conception of freedom between 1927 and 1930 is a reinvention of the positive concept of freedom, developed in confrontation with Immanuel Kant. Further, I have demonstrated that the conception of freedom in Being and Time is the same as the conception presented in the texts: ‘The Essence of Ground’ [WG]; The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic [GA26]; The Essence of Human Freedom [GA31]; and ‘On the Essence of Truth’ [WW]. This is in opposition to the prevailing view in recent scholarship, which argues that there is a difference between the concept of ‘freedom towards death’ [SZ 266] and the account of freedom as ‘freedom for ground’ [WG 165/127], which is taken to be aligned with the statements that freedom is ‘the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of the being of beings’ [GA31 303/207] and that the ‘essence of truth is freedom’ [WW 187/143].