Authenticity and Autonomy

This chapter remains with Being and Time, discussing the parts of the text that have more obviously been related to the idea of freedom: those that deal with the concept of ‘inauthenticity’. I argue that authenticity and inauthenticity are analogous to Kant’s conceptions of autonomy and heteronomy in that they are interpretations of freedom and unfreedom, respectively. §4.1-3 interpret the key discussions of inauthenticity and their causes and demonstrate that Heidegger is thinking about positive freedom and unfreedom in each case. §4.1 looks at the account of the ‘they self’, often interpreted as a critique of conformism in society. §4.2 looks at the account of falling, in which Dasein becomes obsessed with its world rather than facing its own being. §4.3 looks at Heidegger’s conception of anxiety as the cause of this unfreedom: Dasein’s potential to be free makes it anxious, and so it runs away from it §4.4 rounds up the arguments in this chapter by turning to the philosophy of Kant raised in Chap. 2 in order to show that Heidegger has moved beyond it, but still has it in mind. Where Kant interpreted this on the basis of self-legislation, to choose to obey rational laws, for Heidegger, what is at stake is Dasein’s ability to choose to become itself as a whole. In inauthenticity, Dasein lives a fragmented and incomplete life. In authenticity, if it is possible, Dasein would truly become itself by choosing itself.