Analyzing Financial Incentives in Pay-for-Performance Programmes for Health Workers in the United Kingdom and Brazil

This chapter aims to examine the financial incentives received by health workers participating in pay-for-performance (P4P) programs in the United Kingdom and Brazil. Understanding the utilization of financial incentives in assessing public health quality and access is crucial. Data were sourced from official government websites and interviews conducted with experts from reputable institutions such as the University of Cambridge, University of York, University of Kent (UK), Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, and the Ministry of Health (Brazil). The findings reveal that both programs were initiated under progressive governments with the intention of allocating additional resources to public health, albeit not necessarily to enhance service quality. Concepts such as paying-for-performance and computerization are pivotal in comprehending the evaluation mechanisms of these policies. Critical aspects illuminated in this chapter include the potential exclusion of patients with conditions not covered by the program, the absence of mechanisms in both countries to mitigate adverse effects such as low performance results in General Practices and Family Health Teams located in underserved areas, and the risk of gaming.