International Law, Diplomacy and Regional Intervention and Displaced Peoples

Kenya’s role in issues that require multilateral diplomacy, occasional humanitarian intervention and importantly, the use and application of international (humanitarian) law have been well chronicled, albeit at the end of the country’s initial trend towards non-intervention. But regional events and occurrences eventually forced Kenya to become involved, if only for the sake of her national security. The break-up of Somalia in 1991 ushered in a new global era, but importantly, by 1992, saw Kenya ‘welcoming’ more than half a million refugees to the Dadaab refugee camp, while hundreds of thousands of others were in the Kakuma refugee camp in Turkana County, some fleeing drought and others fleeing renewed conflict in Sudan. Kenya’s role in regional peacemaking and later, in peacekeeping activities is well chronicled. From providing a mediator to the Sudan conflict in the person of General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, to hosting summits in Nakuru, Machakos and Naivasha where the Naivasha Accords (or the Comprehensive Peace Accords, the CPA) was signed, to the hosting of Sudanese refugees, Kenya’s place in this respect is secure. In the case of Somalia, after Djibouti’s efforts bore little fruit and the president was rejected, Kenya was tasked again through IGAD, to negotiate a lasting peace. In time, there would be several iterations of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) hosted in Nairobi (which in itself was a diplomatic role few other countries have played), and subsequently, the Federal Government of Somalia, with progress towards the Somali National Army taking over security functions in the country by 2024. Kenya also contributed troops to peacekeeping in Somalia, even as it later decided to invade Somalia in 2011. Kenya has also been the subject of the pacific settlement of disputes through the International Court of Justice, in its dispute with Somalia over where the maritime border is located. While Kenya did not win and threatened to withdraw from ICJ’s (compulsory) jurisdiction, pulling a US-like Connally Reservation, it has not yet followed through with the threat even as it articulated non-recognition of the ruling. Indeed, any student of Kenya’s past 30 years would see contradictions: Kenya has worked with and collaborated with UN principal organs (for example, the AMISOM deployment authorization) and closely with UN Programs and Funds (WHO, UNDP, UNHCR), but in the case of the ICJ, the country did not like the ruling and therefore threatened to leave. Indeed, Kenya’s diplomatic choices can be confounding, even though they generally trend supportive of regional diplomacy.