Lessons from MINUSMA for UN Peace Operations in a Post-Liberal International Order

MINUSMA tested the ability of a UN peace operation to last in an environment affected by terrorism, with mixed results. African contingents have been at the forefront and have paid the heaviest price. But the significant participation of Western contingents in MINUSMA has also helped modernize peacekeeping with new capabilities and advance issues such as medical support and the use of intelligence in peace operations. The necessary adaptation of peacekeeping to contemporary conflicts is not, however, just a question of military capabilities and posture. MINUSMA has also shown the inherent limitations of stabilization mandates focused on state-building when the central state’s presence and legitimacy are contested in conflict contexts that are both more fragmented and regionalized. Practicing the “primacy of politics” in conflict resolution is difficult for a peace operation when the parties to the conflict themselves do not believe in implementing a peace agreement signed under duress. The mission is even more complicated when the Security Council is not united behind common political objectives, and external actors favor military stabilization approaches. As a result, the impartiality of the UN is often eroded and MINUSMA became the collateral damage of the new power rivalries. The closing of this mission undoubtedly turns the page of large multidimensional stabilization operations at a time the UN increasingly faces both the risk of political marginalization and challenges to the liberal norms it has traditionally promoted.