Agent-Based Model of Tax Control Under Information Spreading

We affirm that information about tax audit probability may be encapsulated and analyzed within the formations of taxpayer networks. Hence, our aim is to analyze how information and its dissemination as an element of tax control affects the evolutionary process of paying taxes driven by networks of economic agents. We show the process of dissemination of audit information using evolutionary game theory, taking into account the network structure of interactions between economic agents. We then show that such agents from a population of contributors are more willing to exchange information with their neighbors through the various topological network formations. To support our model, a series of numerical experiments are carried out, for different network topologies, bimatrix instant game structures, and evolutionary dynamics imitation rules. Concluding that tax evasion (whether it is little or a lot) remains present in each taxpayer network regardless of the spread of information and the topology of such networks, but that the networks once identified can be controlled in order to eliminate tax evasion.