Difference Stackelberg Game Theoretic Model of Innovations in Universities as Cournot Oligopoly

We built and investigated a two-level Stackelberg difference game theoretic model “state universities” in open-loop strategies. The role of principal is played by the federal state or its representatives (e.g., Ministry of Education), and the agents are universities competing a la Cournot. The agents invest their financial resources in the development of new electronic learning courses that is considered as innovative investments. In the game of agents in normal form, a Nash equilibrium is built, and in the hierarchical model “principal-agents,” a difference Stackelberg or inverse Stackelberg game is solved. For solution of the respective dynamic control problems, a computer simulation is used. Basing on analysis of the received results, we advocate for impossibility of one-level control systems in the field of management of innovative learning products in universities.