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Intelligence Engineering-Led Set-up of Generic Strategic Options Analysis Problem to Solution Spaces: Cyber Example Demonstration

  • Bruce Garvey,
  • Adam D. M. Svendsen

摘要

Building on insights from previous chapters, we now re-iterate the importance of taking a system-of-systems-based ‘factors’ and ‘indicators’-orientated Intelligence Engineering (IE) approach towards mapping uncertainty for its improved navigation and for decision-making purposes. That last IE approach and methodology, essentially conveyed in the form of a series of framing lenses, assists in the establishment of a generic Problem Space—in the case of the exercise under-examination in this current chapter, focused on the challenge of negotiating widely cast cyber concerns. That IE work then allows for the Strategic Options Analysis (SOA) approach and methodology to be advanced, thereby enabling transformation of the generic Problem Space via Pair-wise Analysis (PWA) evaluations into a Solution Space. This offers a series of viable scenario options for their further exploration and consideration by end-users, such as those participants ranging from analysts to more C-Suite-located decision to policy-makers. During the course of this chapter, both expected—‘anchor’ scenario—and less-expected outcomes—such as presented in the form of an ‘outlier’ scenario—are developed, alongside another additional scenario example being provided for further illustration. The Problem Space presents a generic focus on cyber. During conducting the PWA, the different factors and indicators forming the variables and sub-variables, as well as their respective conditions and states, are judged as being substantially ‘possible’ amongst the range of their assessed compatibilities (consistencies) and incompatibilities (inconsistencies). Therefore, much openness and flexibility is maintained during the formulation of the Solution Space(s), ensuring that adequate possibilities are covered during the scoping of uncertainties that could be at least potentially encountered and then experienced. Radars are deliberately configured as being not too exclusive in their range, ensuring that adequate inclusiveness is covered overall and is sufficiently taken into account for subsequent onwards communication.