Continuity and the Living Present: Husserl and Peirce on Time Consciousness

With respect to time consciousness, “present” is ambiguous between the living present and the absolute present. The living present is a brief, occurrent phase of consciousness. It consists of three moments, a retended moment, a protended moment, and an ur-impression. Any phase of consciousness is an abstraction from the continuous flow of consciousness. Because consciousness is continuous, phases of consciousness are infinitely divisible into shorter and shorter phases of consciousness. The ur-impression, in contrast, is the absolute present. It is not a phase of consciousness at all. Rather, it is the limit between the retended moment and protended moment. The absolute present does not exist in the sense of being a discrete point or piece in the flow of consciousness. Rather, it is a theoretical construct, a merely postulated limit between two segments of the living present. I argue that Husserl and Peirce share this view, that they arrive at this position independently by countenancing the same problems with the same resources, and that their conception of the living present is a direct consequence of their conception of the continuity of consciousness.