Phenomenological Views on Modes of Being, Modes of Evolution, and the Pragmatic Maxim

The article deals first with Husserlian descriptions that can be analyzed in the light of Peirce’s notions. The aim is to show that there is a wider range of agreements than those outlined by H. Spiegelberg’s account on the issue. Firstly, they concern Peirce’s categories. Firstness can be associated with Husserl’s undifferentiated hyletic quality, secondness with the subject-object relationship that emerges on that homogeneous background, and thirdness with the general rule for future experiences that comes forth on the basis of the past ones. It is also argued that Peirce’s modes of evolution show features that also characterize Husserl’s descriptions of the development of reason. Tychism, anancism, agapism, and synechism find parallels in the continuous evolution from latent reason to its full development in the community of love. Another aim of the article is to examine Scheler’s explicit reference to Peirce’s article “How to make our ideas clear.” Scheler holds that Peirce did not intend to state that the meaning of thought only amounts to its practical consequences, but rather that our evaluation of them would lead to a better understanding of the meaning. In the final section, analogies are drawn between the Pragmatic Maxim and Husserl’s views on the commanding influence of the belief in God on the conduct of life as well as between the humble argument for the existence of God and Husserl’s argument referred to the motivating force behind rationality and teleology.