Assertoric (in)Competence as a Factor of Epistemic Irrationality

What are assertions? There is quite extensive literature on this topic (for a review, see Pagin, P., & Marsili, N. (2021). Assertion. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/assertion/ ). My aim, however, is to look at assertions from an unusual perspective: I will focus on the psychological competence that presumably underlies actual behaviors, in order to provide a better understanding of self-deception as a case of epistemic irrationality (for a review of self-deception, see Deweese-Boyd, I. (2021). Self-deception. In E.N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2021 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/self-deception/ ).