On the Relationship Between the Intentional Stance and Robot Responsibility

The increasing autonomy of robots in various human domains raises concerns about their potential moral status. Thus, this chapter explores the concept of personhood, which encompasses rights and duties. Various frameworks of personhood are discussed, with particular emphasis on the rationality/autonomy approach which suggests that mental capacity is necessary for responsibility. This criterion is then discussed in the context of human–robot interaction, where we claim that the perception of an artificial agent’s mental capacity can influence the attribution of responsibility. Specifically, literature both in psychology and ethics suggests that attributions of mental states to robots affects moral responsibility attributions. Moreover, we discuss the consequences of triggering mental state attributions (i.e., the adoption of the Intentional Stance) towards robots. Indeed, inducing the adoption of the Intentional Stance, and subsequently, attribution of moral responsibility, may have unintended outcomes, such as scapegoating. In conclusion, understanding the interplay between triggering the adoption of the Intentional Stance and moral responsibility is crucial for deploying robots in society responsibly, as well as to ensure appropriate accountability in human–robot interactions.