Pragmatism of Existential Ontology

In this chapter, we will proceed to existential phenomenology and investigate praxis in ontological terms. We will start by outlining the basic ontological tenets of existential phenomenology and stressing the mutual relation between being of the world and being of the subject; in this way, we will abandon the transcendental model of argumentation with its rigid distinction between explanans and explanandum. We will both discuss how such a methodological switch helps phenomenology to avoid the objections typically raised by neo-pragmatic authors and how the existential approach proves to be a more flexible approach than the latter. (Sect. 2.1) Based on this discussion, we will further analyse what might be considered pragmatic elements in Heidegger’s early philosophy (Sect. 2.2) and strong and weak aspects of the current pragmatic interpretations of Heidegger’s work proposed most notably by Dreyfus and other philosophers such as Okrent, Wrathall, Haugeland and others (Sect. 2.3).