Ontological Gap in the Neo-Pragmatism

In this chapter, we will provide a background for our investigation by discussing the family of neo-pragmatic approaches and outlining the distinctive feature that differentiates neo-pragmatism from existential phenomenology. Namely, we will see how deep suspicion towards ontological problematics motivates neo-pragmatists to approach the problem of praxis in the epistemic terms of linguistic praxis. Such a suspicion is typical for the most modern pragmatists. This very aspect—in a different but homological way—substantially limits the explanatory scope of neo-pragmatic approaches and results in a number of problems. Using as examples the works of the most prominent contemporary pragmatists (Brandom (Sect. 1.1), Rorty (Sect. 1.2) and Habermas (Sect. 1.3)), we will see how the lack of ontological questioning results in under-explaining the source of normativity in Brandom’s account, inflation of truth and relativistic implications in Rorty’s work and an inability to deal with non-cognitive practices in Habermas.