Finding the Missing Link: Which Organizational Mechanisms Enable the Consolidation of Corruption in Local Governments?

 This chapter centers on the organizational mechanisms that are conducive to the consolidation of corruption in municipal governments. The authors argue that municipal governments in Mexico should be viewed as neo-patrimonial organizations, rather than as rational organizations that align with Weberian bureaucratic characteristics; an assessment that ignores that municipalities are usually far from having the conditions, resources, and capabilities to approach this ideal. While rational bureaucratic organizations aim for the impersonalization of power, neutrality, objectivity, and generalized trust, neo-patrimonial organizations promote values such as reciprocity, communitarianism, friendliness, and particularized trust. The chapter focuses on the divergent objectives, patrimonialism, unwritten rules and chaos that characterize municipal governance and that help explain how systemic corruption takes root in municipal governments. The authors argue that adopting a neo-patrimonial approach helps to identify the basis of the organizational mechanisms underlying the consolidation of corruption and to understand how these mechanisms facilitate the development of solid and stable corruption networks over time.