A Reappraisal of Blaustein’s Exposition of Husserl’s Theory of Content

Blaustein’s analyses contained in Husserlowska nauka… [Husserl’s Theory...] took a wide perspective on the problems discussed in the book. This enabled Blaustein to clearly define the value of Husserl’s theories compared to the traditions of Bolzano as well as Brentano and Twardowski. However, rather than stopping at the presentation and discussion of the theory of content, Blaustein raises interesting objections to it. As I have stressed in the preceding chapter, these objections resulted in part from his original findings that he later used in other object-oriented and systematic research. In the present chapter, I want to ask to what extent his critique of the theory of content in Husserl may be considered valid. I want to define the elements in Blaustein’s interpretation that seem to diverge from Husserl’s position. What comes to the fore in this context is the issue of psychologism and the related problem of understanding reduction. I want to address these two problems at the beginning of the chapter. Next, I will try to formulate a phenomenological, i.e., metaphysically neutral, interpretation of the phenomenal world to which Blaustein referred, as he analyzed the theory of content in Husserl. Finally, I will assess the interpretative proposal made by Blaustein, identifying its strong and weak points.