An Examination of Husserl’s Theory of Content

This chapter is an attempt to analyze the main ideas presented and developed by Blaustein in his early work, Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia [Husserl’s Theory of Act, Content and Object of Presentation], which was originally published in 1928. The book is a revised version of Blaustein’s doctoral thesis and is important for several reasons. First, it seems that the arguments and at least some of the theoretical solutions put forward in it provided the basis for Blaustein’s later reflections. This can be illustrated with two clear examples. One has to do with Blaustein’s use of the tripartite structure of content (which can be understood as quality, matter and presenting content) that he developed in discussion with Husserl and that laid the ground for his original classification of presentations. Another example is his 1930s study on the structure of perception in cinemagoers, in which he reflected on whether a cinemagoer’s experiences are the objects presented on the screen or rather sensations. In direct reference to the results of his previous work, Blaustein eventually opted for the latter. Thus, the book is an important step on the way to understanding how the concepts he used evolved. It is also worth mentioning that, in the global literature, it was perhaps the first extensive monograph devoted to Husserl’s theory of content, a conception which is well known to be very complex. In his interpretation, Blaustein advanced an interesting thesis whereby the conceptions from Logische Untersuchungen and the idea of the matter of an act presented therein are best understood within the framework of a tradition that can be traced back to Bolzano’s and Brentano’s philosophies. This tradition related the issue of content to the understanding of psychic phenomena or, more precisely, to the problem of their structure and the objects to which they refer: what is the relationship between the intentional object and the content of lived experience? Could it be that the object of psychic phenomena is just content? Additionally, how should the content of lived experience be understood here? According to Blaustein, when grappling with these questions, Husserl formulated an original conception of content. However, saying that the main intention of Husserlowska nauka… [Husserl’s Theory…] is to ground phenomenology in the tradition of Brentano would not do full justice to the complexity of the arguments developed in the book. Therefore, what was the novelty of its approach?