Analysis of Blaustein’s Critique of the Phenomenological Method

The psychological themes in the method employed by Blaustein are pervasive, as shown in Chap. 3 . In my analysis of these themes, I put forward the hypothesis that this attachment to psychology determined his view of phenomenology as an empirical discipline, rather than a priori eidetics or transcendental philosophy. Basically, Blaustein assumed that if phenomenology indeed concerns essences, this would mean that it abandons its proper object, i.e., lived experiences. For this reason, according to him, phenomenology ought to become, contra Husserl, an empirical discipline, which seems to suggest that it is possible only as a Brentanian-style descriptive or empirical psychology. Accordingly, Blaustein’s struggles with the phenomenological method can be viewed from a broader perspective. After all, as shown by, e.g., Theodore De Boer, Herbert Spiegelberg, or, more recently, by Andreea Smaranda Aldea and Denis Fisette, phenomenology emerged in a dispute with and in a critical assessment of the heritage of Brentano. Some may claim that Husserl’s break from Brentano was the cornerstone of his original philosophical project, i.e., transcendental phenomenology, which justified its claims as opposed to descriptive psychology. This, it seems, inspired Krzysztof Wieczorek to draw a parallel between Husserl and Blaustein; like Husserl, Blaustein discovered difficulties, inaccuracies, and even aporias in Brentano, and he “naturally” took the position of phenomenology. However, contrary to Wieczorek, I have argued that the psychological themes in Blaustein’s method are irreducible, and it is precisely for that reason that he was a proponent of descriptive psychology.