International Environmental Problems

In this chapter, different types of international environmental problemsInternational environmental problems are analyzed from the perspective of elementary game theory. For the case of reciprocal environmental spillovers, as foremost climate changeClimate change, the basic strategic interactions between countries that determine the outcome in the non-cooperative setting are described in a simple binary game model. It is shown that different game types may occur and how the type of the game may be transformed, e.g., through changing abatement costsAbatement costs or fairnessFairness motivations. Concerning the cooperation, it is explained how in repeated gamesRepeated games international cooperationInternational cooperation can be ensured over time by means of various threat strategies thus overcoming the stabilityStability problem of international environmental agreementsInternational environmental agreements between sovereign states. Finally, we describe—with a focus on global climate policy—how international cooperationInternational cooperation works in reality and which factors are favorable for making international cooperationInternational cooperation on environmental problems successful.