Statebuilding in Kosovo: 1999–2009

In this chapter I begin by outlining the many challenges facing the UN-led mission when it deployed to Kosovo in the Summer of 1999; while these collectively constituted an objectively onerous task, I note that the UN was afforded unprecedented powers. The mission itself was not only initially powerful, it in fact became more powerful in the five years after it was established to the extent that it became perceived by the local population as imperious, unaccountable and a barrier to the realisation of the Kosovo Albanian’s independence aspirations. Having outlined the extent to which UNMIK struggled to maintain a “constructive ambiguity” regarding Kosovo’s final status and caused resentment through its top-down governance style, I demonstrate that the Kosovo Albanian’s anger boiled over in March 2004 resulting in widespread rioting. While the international community condemned the rioters, the violence in fact precipitated a significant change in strategy; thereafter, Western states focused on facilitating Kosovo’s independence. Thus, the Ahtisaari process was launched and while nominal efforts were made to reach an agreement with Serbia and Russia, the process—as expected—culminated in Kosovo unilaterally declaring independence in February 2008. I note in the final section, however, that while Kosovo was thus technically “independent”, the nature of Kosovo’s formally “supervised independence” and the extent to which Western powers—especially the US—designed the constitution and symbols of the new state, meant that Kosovo remained under external control.