The End of History and the Rise of Hope

This chapter initially traces the emergence of the optimistic view of the future which emerged when the Cold War ended, identifying the bases for the key claims made during the 1990s. I demonstrate that while the prevailing narrative was one of hope and progress, others warned that unipolarity was inherently transitory; history proved, they argued, that the dominant power within such a systemic alignment inevitably behaved impulsively, acted arrogantly, and engaged in “imperial overstretch” thereby compelling rival powers to align against it and thus ultimately precipitating their own demise. These warnings were, however, essentially ignored. I then assess the strategies employed during the 1990s and the strengthening of the conviction within the West that there existed a stark core/periphery dichotomy with progress – and even survival – presented as singularly conditional on embracing and adhering to liberal values. Following the disastrous response to the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the conviction that the West should be less constrained by international law, and engage more in benevolent unilateralism, was further strengthened culminating in the “illegal but legitimate” intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Subsequently, I argue that the initiation of the “war on terror” accentuated many of the key themes which had previously guided Western foreign policy. Ultimately, this chapter outlines the broader context within which the disposition adopted by the Internationals in Kosovo existed, demonstrating that the “hubris” that characterised the Internationals did not manifest in a vacuum.