Kosovo and the Dark Side of Hope

In this chapter I provide an overview of the book’s key arguments and theoretical framework. I note that following NATO’s military intervention in 1999 the people of Kosovo were certainly in need of help and were thus metaphorically—and in many cases literally—“patients”. However, I argue that the “doctors”—the Internationals—were not singularly motivated by a desire to help their patients recover, their prescriptions were not effective, and the “hospital” they created within which the people of Kosovo were expected to recuperate was dysfunctional. Additionally, the patients were not as incapacitated as the doctor’s initial diagnosis suggested but, convinced by the doctors—and their local advocates—that their recovery was conditional upon them adopting an uncritically compliant disposition, the majority accepted the nature of the relationship and the prescriptions advanced; it was hope, therefore, which pacified the locals. But it was also hope—albeit a different variant—which inspired the Internationals to behave as they did. Recent events in Kosovo, however, highlight that the damage done by “bad hope” is not irreversible. Both wishful and wilful hopers engage in a form of hoping which is ultimately doomed; as is widely noted, the failure of hopes to materialise can lead to despair which itself manifests as despondency or anger. Despondency and anger have certainly manifested in Kosovo, but “good hope” has triumphed with most people channelling their energy into supporting a political movement promoting a more assertive, self-reliant disposition.