Logic of Emotion

It may seem somewhat strange to suggest that emotions have a logic of their own, given how they have been considered for many centuries to be in opposition to reason. Though a reference to their logic can be found in general in Edmund Burke’s work (Dwan 2011) and more specifically in his “logic of Taste” (Dwan 2011, 584), in the more recent literature reference to how emotions have a logic appears with Robert Solomon, who wrote that “emotions have a logical structure that is no less fascinating and no less analyzable than the logical structures of “reason”” (Solomon 1977, 41). Solomon additionally thinks that it is the theories of emotion available that contribute to the lack of attempts to uncover the logic of emotion. According to him, theories of emotion can be found to belong to three categories that all inhibit the search for the logical structure of emotions. These happens because these theories can either (1) be taken close to physical sensations similar to the description found in common sense, and the way Descartes and Hume understood them; or (2) be taken to be a type of disturbance from an animal like aspect of humans, similar to the Medieval psychophysiology, or a Freudian interpretation, or even the James-Lang feeling theory proposal; or, finally (3) because emotions are taken under a third category that places them as behaviors and actions.