Decision Analysis of Military Supply Chain Based on Stackelberg Game Model

The military supply chain assumes a paramount role in national security and defense infrastructure development, entailing substantial economic implications. Scientifically informed managerial decisions serve as indispensable mechanisms for bolstering the operational efficiency and efficacy of the military supply chain, thereby posing a pragmatic challenge to contemporary decision-makers. This paper introduces the training task volume of military units as an indicator for measuring both the demand of the military and the efficiency of the supply chain for the first time. By constructing a Stackelberg game model, the decision-making behaviors of various members in the military supply chain under different leaderships are studied to explore the influence of leadership on optimal decision-making by each member in the supply chain. The research indicates that leadership dominance significantly affects the profits of members in the military supply chain. A centralized decision-making model is more effective than a decentralized decision-making model in maximizing the overall profits of the military supply chain, providing valuable insights for optimizing management and making scientifically informed decisions in the military supply chain.