Perspective and the Self in Experiential Attitude Reports

It is often assumed that self-directedness (i.e. de se-ness) and first-person perspective (1pp) can be jointly captured through individual centers (s.t. 1pp- and de se-contents both take the form of centered propositions, or properties). This assumption is challenged by instances of ‘outside’ (i.e. objective, or observer) remembering and imagining, which intuitively combine de se with a third-person [= non-actual/non-original, possibly unoccupied] perspective. My paper answers this challenge: It argues that perspective can be captured through a classical propositional account of attitudes that identifies experiential attitude content with a set of situations. Individual centers are only required to account for the de se-status of these attitudes. The separation of modelling mechanisms for perspectivity and de se-ness also enables an account of an inverse phenomenon to outside imagining, viz. first-person perspectival non-de se imagining.