Verifying PLC Programs via Monitors: Extending the Integration of FRET and PLCverif

Verification of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) programs requires reasoning about propositions qualified in terms of time. CERN’s PLCverif, an open-source tool for the analysis of safety-critical PLC systems, uses Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) for the specification of properties. Until now, PLCverif depended on third-party tools that accept LTL specifications to perform verification. However, our experience with industrial PLC programs shows that, to overcome analysis limitations, a wide range of techniques are needed to successfully verify complex properties. In this paper, we extend PLCverif to enable PLC program verification of pure-past LTL (PLTL) safety properties with assertion-based verification tools. To this end, we take an algorithm from the runtime-monitoring domain, apply it to bounded model checking of PLC programs, and implement it in PLCverif. We extend the integration of NASA’s Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET) into PLCverif to use PLTL properties generated with FRET. In addition, we leverage the program structure induced by the PLC scan-cycle for a state-space reduction. Finally, we expose the algorithm to a real-world case study of critical systems at CERN.