De-naturalizing Dispositions: Ryle Helps Wittgenstein

In this chapter I further develop the Wittgensteinian perspective on dispositions by working with Ryle’s notions of “para-mechanical fallacy” and “category mistake”. I will argue that: 1. The current paradigm on dispositions rests on the confusion between the grammatical and the factual, and this confusion is an instance of what Ryle calls a “category mistake”; 2. Ryle’s notion of category mistake also applies to the conceptual misunderstanding of the “shadowy model”, as it is developed and criticized by Wittgenstein. In order to do this, firstly, I will better clarify the philosophical issue of the notion of disposition as a latent but already actualized deposit of actions by looking at Russell’s Analysis of Mind. Secondly, I will engage with Ryle’s remarks on dispositions by looking at his critique of the official Cartesian doctrine of the mind and his analysis and classification of dispositional sentences.