Wittgenstein on Dispositions as Abilities

In this chapter I will fill the exegetical gap about Wittgenstein’s own use of the concept of disposition. Firstly, I will present some dispositional readings of Wittgenstein’s philosophy suggested by the critics. Secondly, I will argue that critics share a false assumption: the idea that Wittgenstein endorses a reductive notion of disposition. On the contrary, I will argue that it is possible to find a Wittgensteinian use of the notion of disposition which is line with my dispositional reading of Rule-following. I will show that Wittgenstein employs a de-naturalized notion of disposition; he does not reject the employment of the notion of disposition, rather he writes against a particular use of the concept which comes from a misleading conception of possibility—the “shadowy model”. According to such a misleading model, linguistic dispositions are mysterious entities or states that contain all the future applications of the word in a latent but already actualized form. Finally, I will present other dispositional elements of Wittgenstein’s philosophy: the dispositional character of aspect-seeing, and the theme of novelty and creativity of behaviour within the boundaries of the conception of understanding as knowledge-how.