Introducing the Nano-dimension: The Biote-Bot Hybrid
摘要
Although the malevolent use of biology and Information Technologies is often visited upon, the microrobotics/microcybernetics as targetable, high-accuracy vectors of microbiota selected or engineered has received preciously little attention. The technologies exist in principle, and some of them are mature. The bot-biote interface may be a bit challenging currently, but this is debatable: the whole idea seems workable without said interface. Technologies transplantable from other uses, applications and sizes, as are microhydraulics or nanoinjections may work instead. But the current level and efficiency of applied research insinuate that the interface issue would be resolved promptly if such a decision is taken. Despite technical progress in automated, uninhabited vehicle control and miniaturization and technological advances in synthetic biology and biotechnology, actual threats of illicit use of bioagents or their inclusion in deployable arsenals in open warfare scenario seems out of pace. Reveals and denials indicate that at least in conceptual level things are progressing to at least modeling and simulation to defend against such eventualities. Although legitimate uses of prospective bioagents are by definition suspect, the level of technology introduces a novel horizon of events regarding concepts and capabilities that must be taken into consideration for mid-and long-term planning of bioresilience and biosecurity. Such eventualities would combine synthetic biology, possibly but not necessarily under the guise of xenobiology or bionic microbiota, with extremely small, pico-aerial vehicles controlled locally or remotely by Artificial Intelligence mindsets as targeted delivery vehicles, thus leveraging small quantities of bioagents by the accuracy in delivery. Such approaches would negate standard surveillance practices, enhance the effectiveness of environmentally unfit but extremely virulent pathogens and would keep research and development and all the subsequent steps of bioagents’ weaponization well below the radar screen of current regimes, while complicating immune response and potentially denying pre-infection detection and identification. The interface would most probably cover the immunodeterminants of the bioagent, thus no immunodiagnostics could ever detect a release prior to live infections taking their toll. No countermeasure, proactive or reactive, seems readily applicable; this concept goes literally below the radar horizon of today’s biosurveillance. A wholly different set of diagnostics and surveillance amenities has to be conceived, specified and then fast-track developed, by intense cooperation of integrated OMICS with exotic areas of cybernetics and Artificial intelligence.