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Causation, Counterfactual Dependence and Potential Outcomes

  • Lars-Göran Johansson,
  • Thomas Banitz,
  • Volker Grimm,
  • Tilman Hertz,
  • Emilie Lindkvist,
  • Rodrigo Martínez Peña,
  • Sonja Radosavljevic,
  • Petri Ylikoski,
  • Maja Schlüter

摘要

When talking about causes we often think of an imagined contrast to the real sequence of events: we use a counterfactual, asking what would have happened if the cause had not occurred. But one might be doubtful about the explanatory force of this analysis. The basic problem is that the truth or falsity of a counterfactual statement cannot be determined by empirical means. In some cases, notably in physics, we can apply a strict law when justifying claims about alternative scenarios. In most cases, however, we have at best regularitiesRegularities and in such cases it is difficult to have any confidence in the corresponding counterfactual. An account of causation in terms of the more restricted concept of potential outcomes is much more useful. It is closer to empirical practice and is more reliable. The main points are: