Nonsense in the Tractatus

Based on the conclusion of Chap. 3 , I propose a new understanding of the analogy from Diktat für Schlick (c. 1933; see Chap. 2 ). I start by showing that Wittgenstein’s remarks on nonsense in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) face two problems analogous to those faced by Loos’s remarks on ornament: the lack of a robust definition of ‘nonsense’ and the lack of explanatory power. I argue that the three strategies available to deal with these difficulties correspond to three existing readings of the Tractatus and that one of them is supported by the analogy: the so-called resolute reading. I then provide an interpretation of the Tractatus, within the framework of the resolute reading, according to which Wittgenstein’s remarks on nonsense were means to the end of showing his readers that they were wrong about the activity in which they were engaging. Thus, I propose that both Loos and Wittgenstein should be understood in light of their shared goal of promoting self-understanding.